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Abstract
We study the distributional consequences of trade in a world with two industries and two
heterogeneous factors of production. Productivity in each production unit reects the ability of
the manager and the abilities of the workers, with complementarity between the two. We begin
by examining the forces that govern the sorting of worker and manager types to industries, and
the matching of workers and managers within industries. We then consider how changes in
relative output prices generated by changes in the trading environment a¤ect sorting, matching,
and the distributions of wages and salaries. We distinguish three mechanisms that govern the
e¤ects of trade on income distribution: trade increases demand for all types of the factor used
intensively in the export sector; trade benets those types of a factor that have a comparative
advantage in the export sector; and trade induces a re-matching of workers and managers within
both sectors, which benets the more able types of the factor that achieves improved matches.
Keywords: heterogeneous labor, matching, sorting, productivity, wage distribution, inter-
national trade.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
How does international trade a¤ect a countrys income distribution? This age-old question has been
the subject of a voluminous theoretical literature dating back at least to Ohlin (1933), Haberler
(1936), Viner (1937), and of course Stolper and Samuelson (1941). But, until recently, research
has focused almost exclusively on the relative earnings of a small number of aggregate (or homo-
geneous) factors of production. One can think of this research as addressing the determinants
of between-occupation or between-skill-groupdistribution. There has also been a between-
industrycomponent to this line of inquiry, as reected in the work by Jones (1971), Mayer (1974)
and Mussa (1974) on models with sector-specicfactors of production.
However, between-occupation and between-industry wage variation tell only part of the in-
equality story. Research using individual-level data nds that within occupation-and-industry wage
variation or within skill-group-and-industry variation contributes at least as much as does between-
group variation to the overall level of earnings inequality in the United States, Germany, Sweden,
and Brazil.1 Moreover, changes in within-group distributions account for a signicant portion of
the recent trends in wage inequality. The evidence of substantial within-group dispersion suggests
the need for a richer theoretical framework that incorporates factor heterogeneity in order to help
us understand more fully the e¤ects of globalization on income distribution.
In this paper, we introduce factor heterogeneity into a multi-factor model of resource allocation
in order to study the distributional e¤ects of international trade in ner detail. As in the familiar
Hecksher-Ohlin model, we assume that output is produced by the combined e¤orts of two factors
(or occupations), which we call workers and managers. These factors are employed in two
competitive industries. But here, the inelastic supply of each factor comprises a continuum of
di¤erent types. Firms form production units that bring together a manager of some type with a
group of workers. There are diminishing marginal returns to adding a greater number of workers
to a team with a given manager, as in the standard model. Meanwhile, the productivity of a unit
depends on the type of the manager and the types of the various workers. Firms must choose not
only how many workers and managers to hire, but also what types to employ. Industries may di¤er
both in their factor intensities (as reected in the diminishing returns to workers per manager) and
in the functions that relate productivity to types.
Our model builds not only on Heckscher and Ohlin, but also on Lucas (1978). Lucas assumed
that a rms productivity depends on the ability of its manager (or entrepreneur), but that
agents are equally productive qua workers. His analysis focused on the sizes of production units as
a function of the types of their managers, but he could not address the composition of these units in
terms of manager-worker combinations. Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) extended Lucass approach
to allow for heterogeneity of both factors. Like Lucas, they modeled only a single good-producing
1See, for example, Card et al. (2013) for Germany, Akerman et al. (2013) for Sweden, Helpman (2015) et al. for
Brazil, Mouw and Kalleberg (2010) for the United States, and others.
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industry and so they could not study the e¤ects of relative output prices on factor rewards. But
they contributed a key result that we borrow here, namely a condition for positive assortative
matching of workers and managers. Like them, we posit the existence of complementarity between
worker ability and manager ability in determining the productivity of production units in each
industry. When these complementarities are strong enough, they imply that rms in an industry
will combine better managers with better workers.2
In general equilibrium models with homogeneous factors of production, resource allocation can
be fully described by the quantities of every input hired into each sector. With heterogeneous
factors, the assignment of di¤erent types must also be considered. In such a setting, two important
aspects of resource allocation that a¤ect income distribution concern the sorting of heterogeneous
managers and workers to industries and the matching of managers and workers in production units
within each one. Sorting that is guided by comparative advantage generates endogenous sector
specicity, which partly links workers and managers rewards to the prices of the goods they
produce. Endogenous matching creates an additional channel absent from previous, multi-sector
trade models through which changes in relative prices can a¤ect the distribution of factor rewards.
If the complementarities between manager and worker ability levels are strong enough to determine
the composition of the production teams that form in general equilibrium, then changes in relative
prices typically induce rematching of managers and workers in each industry. We will be interested
in describing the rematching that results from an improvement in a countrys terms of trade and
in deriving the implications of such changes in the trade environment for within occupation-and-
industry income inequality.3 The role of this channel in shaping within occupation-and-industry
income inequality is a novel contribution of our study.
We are not the rst to study the implications of sorting and matching for income distribution.
However, previous authors have considered the two forces only in isolation. For example, Ohnsorge
and Treer (2007) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) studied the links between trade and income
distribution in an assignment model with heterogeneous workers and many sectors, but with a
linear production function. In this setting, workers sort to sectors, but do not match with any
other factors.4 Yeaple (2005) and Sampson (2014) allow for matching between heterogeneous
workers and rms that have access to di¤erent technologies. These authors too adopt a linear
production function, but since their rms produce di¤erentiated products in a world of monopolistic
competition, the hiring of additional labor generates decreasing returns in terms of revenue, and so
they can analyze the sizes of production units. Our model incorporates the forces found in these
earlier papers, but also identies a novel and important interplay between matching and sorting;
changes in relative prices generate shifts in the extensive margins of factor sorting, which alter the
2See Garicano and Hubbard (2012) for direct evidence of positive assortative matching between managers and
workers in the U.S. legal services industry and Fox (2009) for indirect evidence of such matching across a range of
U.S. and Swedish industries.
3Krishna et al. (2014) report evidence of an endogenous reassignment of workers to rms following the Brazilian
trade reform of 1991. They conclude based on this evidence that [e]ndogenous matching of workers with rms is
thus crucial in determining wage outcomes for workers in open economies(p.252).
4See Ru¢ n (1988) for an antecedent of this approach.
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composition of types in each industry and so force a rematching of factor types.
In Section 2, we lay out our general equilibrium model of competitive resource allocation with
two heterogeneous factors of production. As already mentioned, the model extends the familiar
Heckscher-Ohlin framework to allow for a continuum of types of both factors. In each of the two
industries, the productivity of a production unit that includes a manager and some endogenously-
chosen number of workers is an increasing, log-supermodular function of the abilityof the manager
and the ability levels of the associated workers. We take the relative output price as exogenous,
but use it to represent the countrys trading environment.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium conditions for prot-maximization, factor-market clearing,
and wage and salary determination. We discuss the equilibrium sorting of workers and managers
to industries, rst for a case in which productivity is a constant-elasticity function of the ability of
the manager and the abilities of the workers, and then for a case with stronger complementarities,
namely when productivity is a strictly log-supermodular function of the types. In either case,
sorting by each factor is guided by a cross-industry comparison of the ratio of the elasticity of
productivity with respect to ability to the elasticity of output with respect to factor quantity.
When complementarities are strong, the elasticities of productivity with respect to ability reect
the matches that take place, and so the sorting by each factor depends on the choices made by the
other factor. After describing the sorting conditions, we dene a threshold equilibrium as one in
which sorting of each factor is fully described by a single cuto¤ such that all workers with ability
above the cuto¤ are employed in one industry and the remainder are employed in the other, and
similarly for managers. We provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a threshold equilibrium,
rst allowing for the possibility that high-ability workers and managers might not sort to the same
sector, but then focusing on an equilibrium with positive assortative matching across industries.
After characterizing in Section 4 the matches that form between exogenously given sets of
worker and manager types and discussing how exogenous expansion of these sets induces rematch-
ing that has clear implications for income inequality, we turn in Section 5 to the main task at
hand. Here we ask, how do changes in the trading environment a¤ect earnings inequality between
occupations, between industries, and within occupation and industry. We begin again with the case
of constant-elasticity (or Cobb-Douglas) productivity functions, which generates results that are
instructive even if unrealistic. We show that in this environment, an increase in the relative price
of a countrys export good generates between-occupation redistribution that is reminiscent of the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem and between-industry redistribution that is reminiscent of the Ricardo-
Viner model with sector-specic factors, but it has no a¤ect on within occupation-and-industry
inequality. The complementarities between managers and workers are not strong enough in the
Cobb-Douglas case to determine a unique pattern of matching, and the relative productivities of
di¤erent factor types in an industry are independent of the matches that take place. With the
stronger complementarities that are present when the productivity functions are strictly log super-
modular, the matching pattern in general equilibrium is uniquely determined. Then endogenous
rematching generates predictable changes in within occupation-and-industry income distributions.
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In Section 5.2.1, we take on the case that probably is most empirically relevant, namely one
in which the most able workers and the most able managers sort to the same industry. We show
that if factor intensities are similar in the two industries, a change in relative prices must increase
within-occupation-and-industry inequality for one factor and reduce it for the other. If, instead,
factor intensities di¤er substantially across sectors, then a richer set of outcomes is possible. For
example, an increase in the relative price of the worker-intensive good can raise within-industry
inequality among workers in the labor-intensive industry while reducing within-industry inequality
among those in the other industry.
Finally, in Section 5.2.2, we consider the distributional e¤ects of price changes when the best
workers and the best managers sort to di¤erent sectors. In this case, an increase in the relative price
of the good produced by the low-ability workers attracts to the industry marginal workers who are
more able and marginal managers who are less able than those who are employed there initially.
This results in match downgrading for all workers initially in the expanding sector and for those who
remain in the contacting sector, which in turn spells a narrowing of within-occupation-and-industry
inequality. The outcome for managers is just the opposite.
As the results highlighted in the last two paragraphs illustrate, our framework yields interesting
results concerning the impact of trade on earnings inequality. Section 6 o¤ers some concluding
remarks, including a discussion of some empirical implications of our theory.
2 The Economic Environment
We study an economy that produces and trades two goods. This is a Heckscher-Ohlin economy
with two factors of production that we call managersand workers except that there are many
types of each factor. The inelastic supplies of the heterogeneous workers are represented by a
density function LL (qL), where L is the measure of workers in the economy and L (qL) is a
probability density function (pdf) over worker types, qL. Similarly, the economy is endowed with a
density HH (qH) of managers of type qH , where H is the measure of managers and H (qH) is the
pdf for manager types. We take L (qL) and H (qH) both to be continuous and strictly positive
on their respective bounded supports, SL = [qLmin; qLmax] and SH = [qHmin; qHmax].
We treat factor endowments as exogenous in order to connect our analysis with previous studies
of trade and factor prices in the spirit of Jones (1965, 1971), Mayer (1974), and Mussa (1974). It
might also be interesting to allow for occupational choice, as in Lucas (1978), or human capital
accumulation, as in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983). Of course, other interpretations of the two
factors also are possible. For example, if the factors are labor and capital, one presumably
would want to allow a choice of investment in machines of di¤erent types, as in Acemoglu (1998).
Competitive rms can enter freely into either industry. We describe the technology in industry
i in terms of the output that can be produced by a manager of some type qH when combined with
workers of various types. The manager has a xed endowment of time that she allocates among the
workers under her control. The productivity of each worker increases with the attention devoted by
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the manager, albeit with diminishing returns. In this setting, it generically is optimal for the rm
to form production units that combine a given manager with an (endogenous) number of workers
of a common type.5 Therefore, to save on notation, we describe the technology in sector i in terms
of the amount of potential output xi that can be produced by a unit with one manager of type qH
and ` workers of common type qL, namely
xi =  i (qH ; qL) `
i , 0 < i < 1, for i = 1; 2. (1)
Here,  i (qH ; qL) reects the productivity of the unit and i is a parameter that captures the
diminishing returns to the size of the unit that results from an increase in the managers span of
control. Since we allow 1 to di¤er from 2, rms in di¤erent industries might nd it optimal to
combine a manager with di¤erent numbers of workers. This gives rise to a possible di¤erence in
factor intensities, as in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory.6 The new element is the productivity
term  i (qH ; qL), which is a function of the factor types. We assume that there exists an ordering
of each factor type such that any change in the index a¤ects productivity in the same direction in
both industries. Without further loss of generality, then, we can choose the order so that  i (qH ; qL)
is strictly increasing in each of its arguments for i = 1; 2. Under this labeling convention, we refer
to qH and qL as the abilityof the manager and of the associated workers, respectively.
Importantly, we posit the existence of a complementarity between the ability levels of the
manager and the workers that are employed together in a production unit. More able workers are
more productive than less able workers no matter who is their manager, but the more able workers
are assumed to be relatively more productive compared to their less able counterparts when they
are combined with a more able manager rather than a less able manager.7 Formally, we assume
throughout that  i (qH ; qL) is strictly increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable and we adopt
Assumption 1  i (qH ; qL) is log supermodular for i = 1; 2.
Log supermodularity implies that  i (q
00
H ; q
00
L) = i (q
00
H ; q
0
L)   i (q0H ; q00L) = i (q0H ; q0L) for any q00H > q0H
and q00L > q
0
L. Notice that we allow the industries to di¤er in the strength of the complementarities
between factors, which along with the di¤erences in factor intensities, plays an important role in
determining the sorting of types to the two industries.
Much of our analysis will be carried out with a slightly stronger version of our assumption about
complementarities, namely
5The optimality of combining a given type of manager with workers of a common type arises in other contexts in
which the manager has a span of control besides the particular description we o¤er here; see Eeckhout and Kircher
(2012). They show that the key assumption for this result is that there is no teamwork or synergy between workers
in the rm, who interact only insofar as they compete for the managers time and attention.
6The assumption of a power function for labor i.e., that the technologies are Cobb-Douglas in factor quantities
is made for expositional convenience; many of our results do not require this assumption, so long as there are no
factor intensity reversals.
7See, for example, Garicano and Hubbard (2012), who study assignment patterns in the U.S. legal services industry.
They nd that the more able partners (managers) team with the more able associates (workers) and argue that their
data are best explained by the existence of complementarity between the managersand workersskill or ability.
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Assumption 10  i (qH ; qL) is strictly log supermodular for i = 1; 2.
In this case, the weak inequality described in the previous paragraph becomes a strong inequality.
We take all factor markets to be perfectly competitive and frictionless. That is, any rm can
hire managers and workers of any type at salaries r (qH) and wages w (qL) that it takes as given.
There is no imperfect information about individuals abilities, no search costs of any sort, and
no unemployment. Adding frictions to the formation of production units might be an interesting
extension of our model.8
As in other models with perfect competition, the impact of the trading environment on local
factor prices is conveyed via relative output prices. For example, the opening of trade from autarky
generates an increase in the relative price of a countrys export good. So does a subsequent improve-
ment in its terms of trade. An import tari¤ raises the relative domestic price of a countrys import
good, except under the conditions of the so-called Metzler paradox (Metzler, 1949). The relative
domestic prices in turn determine the equilibrium wage schedule w (qL) and the salary schedule
r (qH). Accordingly, we can study the e¤ects of changes in the trading environment on the earnings
distribution by considering the comparative static changes in the wage and salary schedules that
result from an arbitrary change in relative prices.
3 Sorting and Matching of Managers and Workers
In this section, we lay out the conditions for prot maximization and factor-market clearing, taking
output prices as given. These conditions determine inter alia the sorting of the di¤erent types of
workers and managers to the two industries, the matching of workers and managers in production
units within each sector, and the equilibrium schedules of wages and salaries. We will characterize
the patterns of sorting and matching that can arise in equilibrium and describe some properties
of the earnings schedules. Discussion of the responses of wages and salaries to changes in relative
prices is deferred until Section 5 below.
Consider a rm in sector i that employs a manager of type qH . The rm must choose the type
of workers qL and the number of workers ` to combine with this manager, given the output price
and the wage schedule. The rms prot, gross of salary payment to the manager, is given by
i (`; qL; qH) = pi i (qH ; qL) `
i   w (qL) ` ,
where pi is the price of good i and w (qL) is the competitive wage paid to workers with ability qL.
The rst-order condition with respect to ` yields the conditional labor demand,
` (qL; qH) =

ipi i (qH ; qL)
w (qL)
 1
1 i
, (2)
8 In our working paper, Grossman et al. (2013), we allow for directed search by workers in an environment with
search frictions and unemployment. In that setting, many results have a similar avor to those derived here, but
trade a¤ects the distribution of employment across workers of di¤erent ability, as well as the distribution of wages.
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which is the number of workers the rm would hire if it were to employ a manager with ability qH ,
choose workers of type qL; and face the wage schedule w (qL).
Next, we substitute ` (qL; qH) into the expression for i (`; qL; qH) and compute the rst-order
condition with respect to qL. This yields the rms optimal choice of worker type, given the type
of its manager and taking into account the corresponding size of the optimal production unit. The
rst-order condition can be written as
"iL(qH ; qL)
i
= "w(qL) , i = 1; 2; (3)
where "iL (qH ; qL)  qL [@ i (qH ; qL) =@qL] = i (qH ; qL) is the elasticity of productivity in sector i
with respect to worker ability and "w(qL)  qL [@w (qL) =@qL] =w (qL) is the elasticity of the wage
schedule. Evidently, the rm sets the ratio of the elasticity of output with respect to worker ability
to the elasticity of output with respect to worker quantity equal to the elasticity of the wage
schedule.9 The optimal choice of ability reects the fact that the rm has two ways to expand
output, either by hiring better workers or by hiring more workers. The rate at which wages rise
with ability dictates the appropriate trade-o¤ between the two.
Under Assumption 10, strict log supermodularity of the productivity function, there is in
equilibrium a unique value qL that solves (3) for every qH (see below). In this case we denote by
qL = mi (qH) the solution to (3) in sector i. For the economy as a whole, the matching function
m (qH) consists of m1 (qH) for qH 2 QH1 and m2 (qH) for qH 2 QH2, where QHi is the set of
managers that is hired in equilibrium in sector i. Alternatively, when the productivity function is
log supermodular but not strictly log supermodular, a rm may be indi¤erent between some type
of workers given the ability of its manager, as in the Cobb-Douglas case discussed below.
Who are the managers that actually are hired into sector i in equilibrium? Were a rm to
hire a manager with ability qH and pay her the market salary, r (qH), its net prot would be
i (qH) = ~i (qH)   r (qH), where ~i (qH)  maxf`;qLg i (`; qL; qH) is achieved by choosing ` and
qL according to (2) and (3). In a competitive equilibrium, every rm operating in sector i breaks
even, which implies that i (qH) = 0 for all qH 2 QHi. Moreover, the rms in sector j should not
be able to make strictly positive prots by hiring the managers that sort into sector i, or else they
would hire these managers instead. This implies j (qH)  0 for all qH 2 QHi, j 6= i. We will
return to these zero-prot and optimality conditions below.
9This condition is analogous to the ones in Costinot and Vogel (2010) and Sampson (2014), except that those
papers have i = 1, because workers are the only factor of production and output is linear in labor quantity. A second,
heterogeneous factor of production such as we have introduced here is necessary to generate re-matching within
sectors, which in turn is needed to explain changes in within-occupation-and-industry wage distribution. Eeckhout
and Kircher (2012) show that, given equilibrium wage functions, this condition is necessary and su¢ cient for the
choice of qL.
7
3.1 Matching and Sorting with Cobb-Douglas Productivity
It is instructive to begin rst with a special case in which productivity is a constant elasticity
function of the ability of the manager and that of the worker. For this case, we can write
 i (qH ; qL) = q
i
H q
i
L for i = 1; 2; i; i > 0. (4)
For obvious reasons, we shall refer to this as the case of Cobb-Douglas productivity.
The productivity function in (4) has several special properties that are important in this context.
First, the function is log supermodular, but not strictly so; it satises Assumption 1 but not
Assumption 10. Second, the elasticity of output with respect to worker ability, "iL (qH ; qL), is
a constant i and independent of both qH and qL. We can dene analogously the elasticity of
productivity with respect to manager ability, "iH (qH ; qL)  qH [@ i (qH ; qL) =@qH ] = i (qH ; qL).
This too is a constant, equal to i, in the case of Cobb-Douglas productivity.
With "iL = i, the rst-order condition (3) for a rms interior choice of worker type in sector i
requires that "w (qL) = i=i. However, with an arbitrary wage schedule, this condition will only be
satised by a nite number (possibly only one) of values of qL. Facing such an arbitrary schedule,
all rms active in an industry would hire one of these nite number of types. Such choices would
not be consistent with full employment of the continuum of worker types that sorts to the industry.
We conclude that, as a requirement for full employment, the wage schedule must have a constant
elasticity 1=1 for the range of workers hired into sector 1 and it must have a constant elasticity
2=2 for the range of workers hired into sector 2. In other words,
w (qL) = wiq
i=i
L for all qL 2 QLi, i = 1; 2; (5)
for some constants, w1 and w2, where QLi is the set of workers hired in sector i. The wage schedule
(5) makes any rm operating in industry i indi¤erent between the potential employees in QLi no
matter what is the type of its manager. It follows that matching of workers and managers is not well
determined for the case of Cobb-Douglas productivity; any matches between workers in QLi and
managers in QHi can be consistent with equilibrium, provided that the numbers in all production
units are given by (2) and that the factor-market clearing conditions are satised.
Which workers are employed in each industry? Consider Figure 1, which depicts the qualitative
features of the equilibrium wage schedule when sL  1=1   2=2 > 0. Once the wage
anchors, w1 and w2, have been determined in the general equilibrium, the solid curve in the
gure represents the wage schedule that satises (5). The broken curves show what wages for
di¤erent types of workers would have to be in order to make the rms in an industry indi¤erent
between hiring these types and the types that are actually employed in equilibrium. The fact that
1=1 > 2=2 implies that the solid curve lies above the broken curve for industry 2 to the right
of the point of intersection, qL, and that the solid curve lies above the broken curve for industry
1 to the left of the intersection point. In equilibrium, the rms in industry 1 are willing to hire
any workers with ability above qL, but not those with ability below this level. Meanwhile, rms in
8
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Figure 1: Wage Schedule
industry 2 are willing to hire any workers with ability below qL, but not those with ability above
this level. Evidently, those with ability above qL sort to industry 1 and those with ability below
qL sort to industry 2, and the marginal workers with ability equal to q

L are paid the same wage in
either sector. Sorting of workers is guided by sL, the cross-industry comparison of the ratio of the
elasticity of productivity with respect to ability to the elasticity of output with respect to quantity.
What about the managers? In the online appendix we show that the zero-prot condition,
i (qH) = 0 for all qH 2 QHi, together with (2), (3) and (5), imply that
r (qH) = riq
i=(1 1)
H for all qH 2 QHi, i = 1; 2; (6)
where ri is a constant analogous to wi.10 Then the condition that j (qH)  0 for all qH 2 QHi,
j 6= i; (i.e., that rms do not want to hire the managers employed in the opposite sector) dictates
the sorting pattern for managers: If sH  1= (1  1)   2= (1  2) > 0, then managers with
ability above some cuto¤ qH sort to sector 1 and those with ability below q

H sort to sector 2;
otherwise, the sorting pattern is just the opposite. Notice that the sorting pattern for managers
can be understood similarly to that for workers. Constant returns to scale implies that the elasticity
of output with respect to the number of managers in sector i is 1  i. So, manager sorting also is
guided by a cross-industry comparison of the ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to
ability to the elasticity of output with respect to number.
The case of Cobb-Douglas productivity generates what we will call a threshold equilibrium; the
equilibrium sorting pattern is characterized by a pair of boundary points, qL and q

H , such that
all workers with ability above qL sort to some sector while those with ability below q

L sort to
the other, and similarly all managers with ability above qH sort to some sector while those with
ability below qH sort to the other.
11 We note for future reference that there are two possible types
10The constants, w1 and w2, are determined along with qL by a pair of labor-market clearing conditions for the
two sectors (which are provided in the appendix) and the requirement that the wage function is continuous at qL;
i.e., w1 (qL)
1=1 = w2 (q

L)
2=2 . Given w1 and w2, the salary anchors r1 and r2 are readily calculated.
11For some prices, there may be complete specialization in one sector or the other, in which case qL = qLmin
or qL = qLmax and q

H = qHmin or q

H = qHmax. In such cases, marginal changes in prices have no e¤ect on the
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of threshold equilibrium that can emerge. If sL and sH share the same sign, then the most able
workers and the most able managers sort to the same sector. We refer to this below as an HH=LL
equilibrium, to convey that the high typesof both factors sort together, as do the low types.
Alternatively, if sL and sH are opposite in sign, then the more able managers sort to the same
sector as the less able workers. We will refer to such an outcome as an HL=LH equilibrium. In
the online appendix we examine compensation patterns in Brazil and nd that average wages of
workers and average salaries of managers are highly correlated across industries, suggesting that
the HH=LL equilibrium may be the more empirically relevant of the two.
3.2 Matching and Sorting with Strictly Log Supermodular Productivity
Armed with an understanding of the knife-edge case of Cobb-Douglas productivity, we turn to a
setting with stronger complementarities between manager and worker abilities that arises under
Assumption 10, which is our central case of interest.
When the productivity function  i (qH ; qL) is strictly log supermodular, the arguments pre-
sented in Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) imply that mi (qH) is an increasing function, so that there
is positive assortative matching (PAM) in each industry. That is, among the workers and managers
that sort to a given industry, the better workers are teamed with the better managers. This is true,
because the productivity of a group of more able workers relative to that of a group of less able
workers is higher when the groups are combined with a more able manager compared to when they
are combined with a less able manager. As we shall see, the equilibrium may or may not exhibit
PAM for the economy as a whole. We have (see the online appendix for proof):
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds. Then: (i) mi (qH) is a strictly increasing func-
tion for qH 2 QHi, i = 1; 2; (ii) the graph
Mi = [fqH ; qLg j qL = mi (qH) for all qH 2 QHi]
consists of a union of connected and closed sets Mni , n 2 Ni (i.e., Mi = [n2NiMni ), such that
mi (qH) is continuous in each set Mni .
The second part of the proposition implies that the equilibrium allocation sets QLi and QHi are
unions of closed intervals. A threshold equilibrium is the special case in which eachQFi for F = H;L
and i = 1; 2, is a single interval. The equilibrium matching function for the economy, which we
have denoted by m (qH), comprises m1 (qH) for qH 2 QH1 and m2 (qH) for qH 2 QH2.
We prove in the online appendix that the equilibrium wage schedule is di¤erentiable almost
everywhere (i.e., except possibly for types that are indi¤erent between the industries). Then, using
the notation for the matching function, we can rewrite (3) as
"iL [qH ;m (qH)]
i
= "w [m (qH)] for all fqH ;m (qH)g 2Mn;inti , n 2 Ni, i = 1; 2; (7)
equilibrium, and so they are uninteresting for our purposes. We do not consider them any further.
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whereMn;inti is the setM
n
i excluding its endpoints.
12 This way of expressing a rms optimal choice
of workers emphasizes that the elasticity of productivity with respect to worker ability depends upon
the matches between workers and managers that actually form in equilibrium. These matches in
turn reect the sorting patterns of workers and managers to industries.
Using (2) and (3), the zero-prot condition i (qH) = 0 for all qH 2 QHi can be written now as
r (qH) = 
i
1 i
i (1  i) p
1
1 i
i  i [qH ;m (qH)]
1
1 i w [m (qH)]
  i
1 i for all qH 2 QHi; i = 1; 2: (8)
This equation and (7) imply that
"iH [qH ;m (qH)]
1  i
= "r (qH) for all fqH ;m (qH)g 2Mn;inti ; i = 1; 2; (9)
where "r(qH)  qH [@r (qH) =@qH ] =r (qH). Notice the similarity with (7); prot maximization and
zero prots ensure that the ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to manager ability to
the elasticity of output with respect to manager quantity is equal, in equilibrium, to the elasticity of
the salary schedule. But, as with workers, the elasticity of productivity with respect to (manager)
ability depends on the matches that occur in equilibrium.
Equations (7) and (9) comprise a pair of di¤erential equations that relate the matching function,
the wage schedule and the salary schedule. A third such equation can be derived from the require-
ments for factor-market clearing. To this end, consider any connected set of managers [qHa; qH ]
that sorts to industry i and the set of workers qL 2 [m (qHa) ;m (qH)] with whom these managers
are matched in equilibrium. A prot-maximizing rm in sector i that employs a manager with
ability qH and workers of ability qL hires ir (qH) = (1  i)w (qL) workers per manager. Since the
matching function is everywhere increasing, it follows that
H
Z qH
qHa
ir (q)
(1  i)w [m (q)]
H (q) dq = L
Z m(qH)
m(qHa)
L [m (q)] dq ;
where the left-hand side is the measure of workers hired collectively by all rms operating in sector
i that employ managers with ability between qHa and qH and the right-hand side is the measure
of workers available to be teamed with those managers. Since the left-hand side is di¤erentiable
in qH as long as qH is not indi¤erent between industries, this equation implies that the matching
function m (qH) also is di¤erentiable at such points. That being the case, we can di¤erentiate the
labor-market clearing condition with respect to qH to derive a di¤erential equation for the matching
function, namely
H
ir (qH)
(1  i)w [m (qH)]
H (qH) = LL [m (qH)]m
0 (qH) for all fqH ;m (qH)g 2Mn;inti . (10)
This condition states that the workers demanded by a (small) set of managers with ability in a small
12Due to the continuity of mi (qH) in Mni , the set M
n
i is a one-dimensional submanifold of the two-dimensional
plane and it has two end points.
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range around qH equals the density of workers in the economy that match with these managers.
At last, we are in a position to characterize an equilibrium allocation for the economy, given
prices. Such an allocation is fully described by a quadruple of sets, QiF for F = H;L and i = 1; 2,
a continuous wage schedule w (qL), a continuous salary schedule r (qH) and a piecewise continuous
matching function m (qH) that satisfy the di¤erential equations (7), (9) and (10) and that yield
zero prots per (8) for any active sector (and non-positive prots for any inactive sector).
The sorting patterns can be quite complex. We wish to identify conditions that ensure a simple
pattern namely, a threshold equilibrium which is the pattern that emerges in an economy with
Cobb-Douglas productivity functions. To motivate our next proposition, recall Figure 1. The gure
shows the wage function and shadow wage functions that result with Cobb-Douglas productivity.
The rms in industry 1 can outbid those in industry 2 for workers with qL > qL, because the
ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to worker ability to the elasticity of output with
respect to number of workers is higher there. Similarly, industry 2 is willing to pay the most to
workers with qL < qL, because "2L=2 < "1L=1. The wage and shadow-wage functions reect these
(constant) elasticity ratios at each point in the ability distribution.
The wage and shadow-wage functions also reect these elasticity ratios when the productivity
functions are strictly log supermodular; see (3). A potential complication arises, however, because
a workers elasticity ratio depends upon the ability of the manager with whom he is matched,
which in turn depends upon the sorting incentives that confront the managers. But suppose that
the elasticity ratio in industry 1 is higher than that in industry 2, even if in the former case the
workers of some ability level are teamed with the economys least able manager and in the latter
case they are teamed with the economys most able manager. Considering the complementarity
between worker and manager ability levels, the elasticity ratio in industry 1 for a given worker then
must be higher than that in industry 2 for the matches that actually take place, no matter what
they happen to be. These circumstances ensure the existence of a cuto¤ ability level for workers
qL such that rms in industry 1 are willing to pay more than industry 2 for workers with qL > q

L,
and the opposite is true for workers with qL < qL. In the online appendix, we formally prove
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds and that
"iL (qHmin; qL)
i
>
"jL (qHmax; qL)
j
for all qL 2 SL; i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2. Then, in any competitive equilibrium with employment of
workers in both sectors, the more able workers with qL > qL are employed in sector i and the less
able workers with qL < qL are employed in sector j, for some q

L 2 SL.
We have seen for the case of Cobb-Douglas productivity that an analogous condition that
compares elasticity ratios across sectors guides the sorting of managers. Specically, whichever
industry has the higher ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to manager ability to
the elasticity of output with respect to manager quantity attracts the more able managers. Again,
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with a general, strictly log supermodular productivity function the sorting incentives for the other
factor (workers, in this case) can complicate this comparison of elasticity ratios. But, in analogy
to Proposition 2, they will not do so if the forces attracting the more able managers to sort to a
sector would remain active even if the match there were consummated with the economys least
able workers and the match in the other sector were consummated with the economys most able
workers. We record
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds and that
"iH (qH ; qLmin)
1  i
>
"jH (qH ; qLmax)
1  j
for all qH 2 SH ; i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2. Then, in any competitive equilibrium with employment of
managers in both sectors, the more able managers with qH > qH are employed in sector i and the
less able managers with qH < qH are employed in sector j, for some q

H 2 SH .
Clearly, if the inequality in Proposition 2 holds for some i and j and the inequality in Proposition
3 also holds for some i0 and j0, then the outcome is a threshold equilibrium. As with the case of
Cobb-Douglas productivity, such an equilibrium can take one of two forms. If i = i0 and j = j0,
then the more able workers sort to the same sector as the more able managers, which characterizes
an HH=LL equilibrium. Alternatively, if i = j0 and j = i0, then the more able workers sort to the
opposite sector from the more able managers, which denes an HL=LH equilibrium.
It is possible to provide a weaker su¢ cient condition for the existence of a threshold equilibrium
of the HH=LL variety. If the most able managers sort to some industry i, this can only strengthen
the incentives for the most able workers to sort there as well, considering the complementarities
between factor types. Similarly, if the most able workers sort to industry i, this will strengthen
the incentives for the most able managers to do so as well. This reasoning motivates the following
proposition (proven in the online appendix).
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds. If
"iL (qH ; qL)
i
>
"jL (qH ; qL)
j
for all qH 2 SH ; qL 2 SL;
and
"iH (qH ; qL)
1  i
>
"jH (qH ; qL)
1  j
for all qH 2 SH ; qL 2 SL;
for i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2, then in any competitive equilibrium with employment of managers and
workers in both sectors, the more able managers with qH > qH and the more able workers with
qL > q

L are employed in sector i; while the less able managers with qH < q

H and the less able
workers with qL < qL are employed in sector j, for some q

H 2 SH and some qL 2 SL.
The di¤erence in the antecedents in Propositions 2 and 3 on the one hand and in Proposition
4 on the other is that, in the former, we compare the elasticity ratio for each factor when it is
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combined with the least able type of the other factor in one sector versus the most able type
in the other sector, whereas in the latter we compare the elasticity ratios for common partners
in the two sectors. The di¤erence arises, because an HH=LL equilibrium has PAM within and
across industries, whereas an HL=LH equilibrium has PAM only within industries. In an HL=LH
equilibrium, an able manager in sector i might be tempted to move to sector j despite a generally
greater responsiveness of productivity to ability in i, because the better workers have incentive to
sort to j, and with log supermodularity of  j (), the able manager stands to gain most from this
superior match. In contrast, in an HH=LL equilibrium, the able manager in sector i would nd
less able workers to match with were she to move to sector j, so the temptation to switch sectors
in order to upgrade partners is not present.
We have derived su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a threshold equilibrium in which the
allocation set for each factor and industry comprises a single, connected interval. These conditions
are not necessary, however, because the matches available to types that are quite di¤erent from
the marginal type might not overturn their comparative advantage in one sector or the other.
Nonetheless, not all parameter congurations give rise to equilibria with such a simple sorting
pattern. An example of a more complex sorting pattern and the parameters that underlie it is
provided in Lim (2015). In that example, the most able and least able workers sort to sector 1 while
an intermediate interval of worker types sort to sector 2. The rms in sector 1 hire the economys
most able managers whereas those in sector 2 hire those with ability below some threshold level.
The matching function m (qH) is piecewise continuous and exhibits PAM within each industry. But
the example illustrates a sorting reversal for workers that arises because the elasticity ratio for
labor is higher in sector 1 when worker ability is low or high, but higher in sector 2 for a middle
range of abilities. Of course, other sorting patterns besides the one depicted in this example also
are possible.
4 Matching and Earnings within Groups
Before we turn to the e¤ects of changes in the trade environment on the distributions of wages
and salaries, it will prove useful to examine in some detail the implications of our equilibrium
conditions for the particular matches that form among a group of workers and a group of managers
that happen to be combined in equilibrium, and for the distributions of wages and salaries in the
two groups. To this end, consider a group of managers comprising all those with ability in the
interval QH = [qHa; qHb] and a group of workers comprising all those with ability in the interval
QL = [qLa; qLb]. Suppose these two groups happen to sort to some industry i in a competitive
equilibrium and that, collectively, the managers and workers in these two groups happen to be
matched together, exhaustively. We are interested in the properties of the solution to the system
of di¤erential equations comprising (7), (9) and (10) along with the zero-prot condition, (8), and
the two boundary conditions, qLa = mi (qHa) and qLb = mi (qHb). Throughout this section, we
assume the existence of strong complementarities between worker and manager types; i.e., we take
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Figure 2: Shift in the matching function when qL rises at the top and qH rises at the bottom.
productivity to be a strictly log supermodular function of the two ability levels.
In the appendix, we prove that the solution has several notable properties. First, if the price pi
were to rise without any change in the composition of the two groups, then the matches between
particular members of the groups would remain unchanged and all wages and salaries would rise
by the same proportion as the output price. Second, if the number of managers in QH were to
increase by some proportion h relative to the number of workers in QL, without any change in
the relative densities of the di¤erent types, then the wages of all workers in QL would rise by the
proportion (1  i)h, while the salaries of all types in QH would fall by the proportion ih. Again,
there would be no change in the matching between manager and worker types.
Now suppose that one or both of the groups were to expand or contract on the extensive margin
without any change in the composition of types among the original members of the two groups. That
is, suppose that QH were to change to Q0H = [q
0
Ha; q
0
Hb] and QL were to change to Q
0
L = [q
0
La; q
0
Lb],
but with no change in LL (qL) or HH (qH). We nd (see Lemma 2 in the appendix) that the
matching functions that apply before and after the change can intersect at most once. Moreover
(see Lemma 6), if such an intersection exists, the situation with the steeper matching function at
the point of intersection also has lower wages and higher salaries for all ability levels of workers and
managers that are common to the two settings. This reects the associated changes in the sizes
of the production units; a steeper matching function implies that each manager is teamed with
a larger group of workers, which enhances the marginal product of the manager and reduces the
marginal product of the workers at any given ability level of either factor.
These points can be seen more clearly with the aid of Figure 2, which exhibits two (inverse)
matching functions: one by the thick curve between points a and b, the other by the thin curve
between points a0 and b0. The di¤erence in the two matching functions reects a di¤erence in
boundary points; in the gure, q0Ha > qHa and q
0
Lb > qLb. Due to PAM, both curves slope upwards.
Although for general boundary changes the two curves need not intersect (one can be everywhere
above the other), continuity of the matching functions implies that for the situation depicted in the
gure the two curves must intersect at least once. However, by Lemma 2 in the appendix, the two
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curves can have at most one point in common, so there can be no points of intersection besides c.
Since the thin matching function is steeper at c (the inverse matching function is atter), Lemma
6 implies that managerial salaries are higher for managers with qH 2 [q0Ha; q0Hb] while wages fall for
all workers with qL 2 [qLa; qLb].
A special case arises when only one boundary point changes. If, for example, qLb increases to
qLb0 while QH does not change, then the point (qLa; qHa) is common to the two matching curves.
The slope of the thin matching function must be greater at the single point of intersection than
the that of the thick matching function. Therefore salaries rise for all mangers in QH and wages
fall for all workers in QL.
The adjustment in matching that is illustrated in Figure 2 also has implications for within-
group inequality. Consider the wage distribution among workers in QL. The di¤erential equation
(7) implies that
lnwi (qLz0)  lnwi (qLz) =
Z qLz0
qLz
 iL [i (x) ; x]
i i [i (x) ; x]
dx; for all qLz;qLz0 2 QL ; (11)
where i () is the inverse of mi (). If follows that, if all workers with abilities between some qLz
and qLz0 are teamed with less able managers than before, the wage of type qLz0 declines relative
to that of type qLz. The downgrading of managers is detrimental to both of these workers, but
the complementarity between factor types means that it is especially so to the more able of the
pair. Specically, strict log supermodularity of  i (qH ; qL) implies that  iL (qH ; qL) = i (qH ; qL) is
a strictly increasing function of qH . It follows that a rematching of a group of workers with less
able managers, as depicted in Figure 2 for workers with ability to the right of point c, generates
a narrowing of wage inequality within this group. And a rematching of a group of workers with
more able managers, as depicted in Figure 2 for workers with ability to the left of point c, gen-
erates a widening of wage inequality within this group.13 By a similar argument (and using the
di¤erential equation (9) for salaries), the rematching depicted in Figure 2 generates a spread in the
salary distribution for managers in Q0H with abilities above point c and a narrowing in the salary
distribution for managers in Q0H with abilities below point c. We therefore have:
Proposition 5 If Assumption 10 holds, then whenever matches improve for a group of workers
employed in some sector, they deteriorate for the managers with whom they were paired, and vice
versa. As a result, whenever matches either improve or deteriorate for all workers in a sector,
within-occupation-and-industry inequality among workers and managers shift in opposite directions.
This is a testable implication of our model. It nds some (weak) support in the Brazilian data
presented in the online appendix, where we show that changes in inequality among Brazilian workers
and managers are negatively correlated across industries, albeit insignicantly so.
13Costinot and Vogel (2010) and Sampson (2014) nd similar results for wage inequality when workers downgrade
their matches with rms that di¤er in technological sophistication.
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5 The E¤ects of Trade on Earnings Inequality
We come nally to the main concern of our analysis: How does trade a¤ect the distribution of
earnings within and between occupations and industries? We study the e¤ects of trade by examining
comparative statics with respect to output prices. In a world of competitive industries, an opening
of trade induces an increase in the relative price of a countrys export good. An expansion of trade
opportunities does likewise. So too does a reduction in a countrys import barriers, except under
conditions for the Metzler paradox. So, we can study the e¤ects of trade without introducing details
of other countries simply by investigating how output prices feed through to factor markets.14
To preview what lies ahead, we will identify and describe three forces that are at work in this
setting. Two are familiar and one is new. First, whenever 1 6= 2, our model features factor
intensity di¤erences across industries. As is well known from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,
this consideration introduces an e¤ect of trade on between-occupation distribution; an increase in
the relative price of a good tends to increase demand for all types of the factor used intensively
in producing that good, while reducing the demand for all types of the other factor. Second,
our model incorporates factor heterogeneity that, whenever  1 () 6=  2 (), generates comparative
advantage for certain types of each factor in one industry or the other. This feature introduces an
e¤ect of trade on between-industry distribution; an increase in the relative price of a good tends
to increase the rewards for all types of both occupations that enjoy a comparative advantage in
producing that good, and to reduce the returns to types that hold a comparative disadvantage
in doing so. This e¤ect is familiar from the Ricardo-Viner model with sector specicity. Finally,
whenever  i (qH ; qL) exhibits strict log supermodularity, our model determines the matches that
form between managers and workers in each industry. This feature introduces an e¤ect of trade on
within-group (occupation-and-industry) distribution.
As shown in Akerman et al. (2013), the within occupation-and-industry variation in wages
accounts for 59% of the variance of log wages in Sweden in 2001 and 66% of the change in this
measure of inequality between 2001 and 2007 (see their Table 2). Moreover, it also explains 83% of
the residual wage inequality in 2001 and 79% of the change in residual wage inequality between 2001
and 2007 (see their Table 3), with residual wage inequality accounting for 70% of wage inequality
in Sweden in 2001 and 87% of the change in wage inequality between 2001 an 2007. A comparably
large role of wage variation within occupation-and-industry is reported in Helpman et al. (2015) for
Brazil. We identify a channel through which trade impacts within occupation-and-industry wage
inequality that may contribute to explaining these features of the data.
14 In our working paper, Grossman et al. (2013), we link the pattern of trade to cross-country di¤erences in
quantities and distributions of the two factors. Thus, we treat the price change that results from an opening of trade
as an endogenous reection of factor-endowment di¤erences. Here, we take the price changes as exogenous in order
to focus attention on the distributional implications of changes in the trade environment.
17
5.1 Wages and Salaries with Cobb-Douglas Productivity
As before, it is instructive to begin with the case in which productivity in each sector is only weakly
log supermodular. We revisit an economy with Cobb-Douglas productivity as described in (4).
Recall from Section 3.1 that, with Cobb-Douglas productivity in each sector, the sorting of fac-
tors to sectors is guided by a cross-industry comparison of the ratio of the elasticity of productivity
with respect to a factors ability to the elasticity of output with respect to factor quantity. That
is, when i=i > j=j , higher ability confers a comparative advantage among workers for employ-
ment in industry i, while when i0= (1  i0) > j0=
 
1  j0

, higher ability confers a comparative
advantage among managers for employment in industry i0.
It is clear from (5) and (6) that trade has no e¤ect on within-group inequality in these cir-
cumstances. The relative wage of any two workers with ability levels qLa and qLb that are both
employed in the same sector i before and after any change in the trading environment is fully
determined by their relative ability levels; i.e., w (qLa) =w (qLb) = (qLa=qLb)
i=i . Similarly, the
relative salary of any two managers with ability levels qHa and qHb that are employed in sector i
prior to and subsequent to a change in the trading environment is fully determined by their relative
abilities. Evidently, the complementarity between factor types must be strong enough to induce
meaningful rematching, or else relative wages within any occupation-and-industry group will be
xed by technological considerations and una¤ected by trade.
The e¤ects of trade on between-occupation and between-industry inequality are derived in the
online appendix. Here we briey report certain limiting cases. Suppose, for example, that i  j ;
i.e., there are only small cross-industry di¤erences in factor intensity. In this case, if j > i,
high-ability workers have a comparative advantage in sector j relative to sector i, and vice versa
for low-ability workers. Then, if the relative price of good j increases, this changes the between-
industry distribution, favoring those (high-ability workers) employed in sector j relative to those
(low-ability workers) employed in sector i. Every worker ultimately employed in sector j gains
relative to every worker ultimately employed in sector i: An analogous explanation applies to the
changes in the between-industry distribution of managerial salaries when j > i.
If, in addition to i  j and j > i, we have i  j, then the workers have industry
specicity, but the managers do not (or only slightly so). As in the classic Ricardo-Viner model
(e.g., Jones, 1971), we nd that when the relative price of good j rises, the real incomes of all
(high-ability) workers who start in industry j increase while the real incomes of all (low-ability)
workers who remain in industry i fall. In contrast, trade has a qualitatively similar impact on all
manager types; their real salaries rise in terms of good i but fall in terms of good j.
Now suppose that j > i, whereas i=i  j=j and i= (1  i)  j=
 
1  j

. With
this constellation of parameters, the forces that give certain types of each factor a comparative
advantage in one sector or the other are muted. No matter what sorting pattern emerges, the
predominant e¤ect of trade will be on the between-occupation distribution. In particular, since
sector j makes relatively intensive use of workers and sector i makes relatively intensive use of
managers, an increase the relative price of good j raises wages of workers relative to salaries of
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managers. Indeed, we can go further to say as an extension of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
that when j > i, an increase in the relative price of good j raises the real income of every type
of worker and reduces the real income of every type of manager.15
In less extreme cases, the Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner forces coexist. We nd that
the worker types with comparative advantage in industry i always gain relative to those with
comparative advantage in industry j when the relative price of good i rises. Similarly, the manager
types that sort to industry i gain relative to those that sort to industry j. Whether a group
of workers or a group of managers benets absolutely, and not just relatively, from a change in
the trade environment depends on the direction and strength of the Stolper-Samuelson forces; for
example, all workers may gain from an increase in pi=pj if industry i is much more labor intensive
than industry j, whereas only some may gain if the di¤erence in factor intensity is smaller, and all
may lose if the factor-intensity ranking runs in the opposite direction.16
The results described here are interesting and will help us to understand those that follow. But
the Cobb-Douglas case does not permit trade to a¤ect within occupation-and-industry earnings
inequality. Yet Helpman et al. (2015) show, for example, that within-group variation accounted
for a majority of the overall change in Brazilian wage inequality that occurred during the period
that spanned the trade liberalization of 1991 (see also our online appendix for a discussion of this
evidence). To allow for changes in within-group inequality, we must re-introduce Assumption 10.
5.2 Wages and Salaries with Strictly Log Supermodular Productivity
We henceforth assume that productivity in each sector is a strictly log supermodular function of
the ability of the manager and the abilities of the workers; i.e., we adopt Assumption 10. We shall
limit our attention to threshold equilibria; i.e., those that can be characterized by a pair of cuto¤
points, qL and q

H ; such that all workers with ability above the cuto¤ sort to one industry and all
those with ability below the cuto¤ sort to the other, and similarly for managers.
In the online appendix, we prove a general result that applies to all threshold equilibria. Consider
the e¤ects of a change in the relative price of some good j on output levels and factor allocation.
Not surprisingly, an increase in pj=pi induces a rise in the aggregate output of good j and a decline
in the aggregate output of good i. In principle, this could be accomplished by a reallocation of
only one factor from industry i to industry j. In fact, however, this does not happen; when pj=pi
rises, the numbers of workers and managers employed in sector j both expand, while the numbers
employed in sector i contract, through changes in qL and q

H .
Recall that two types of threshold equilibria can arise in our model, an HH=LL equilibrium in
which the more able types of both factors sort to the same industry and an HL=LH equilibrium in
15 If we instead assume that j > i and i=i > j=j , while i= (1  i)  j=
 
1  j

, then the Stolper-
Samuelson forces reinforce the positive e¤ects of an increase in the relative price of good j on the low-ability workers
while o¤setting the negative e¤ects of this price change on the high-ability workers. In such circumstances, the real
incomes of the least able workers must rise, whereas those of the most able workers can rise or fall.
16These ndings are reminiscent of those described by Mussa (1982) for an economy with imperfect factor mobility
and by Grossman (1983) for an economy with partially mobile capital.
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Figure 3: E¤ects of a rise in p2=p1 on matching: HH=LL equilibrium
which the more able managers sort to the same industry as the less able workers. Only the former
type of equilibrium exhibits economy-wide PAM. In the online appendix we report a strongly
positive correlation across industries between the average wage paid to Brazilian workers and the
average salary paid to managers. This suggests that, at least in Brazil, positive assortative matching
is an economy-wide phenomenon. Accordingly, we focus most of our attention on the HH=LL
equilibrium. Inasmuch as the HL=LH may be relevant in other contexts, we briey discuss some
interesting features of such equilibria in Section 5.2.2 below.
5.2.1 Inequality in an HH=LL Equilibrium
In Figure 3, the thick curve abc represents the qualitative features of the inverse matching function
in an initial HH=LL equilibrium in which the most able types of both factors sort to industry 1.
The curve is upward sloping along its entire length, reecting PAM within and across sectors. Now
suppose that the relative price of good 2 rises, inducing a reallocation of resources to industry 2.
From our earlier discussion, we know that both qL and q

H must increase, which means that point
b shifts up and to the right. The gure depicts three conceivable locations for the new threshold,
at b1, b2 and b3. Lim (2015) provides numerical examples of each such possibility.
If the new threshold falls at a point such as b1, the outcome implies match upgrades for all
workers and match downgrades for all managers. If, instead, the new threshold falls at a point such
as b2, the managers see their matches improve, while workers see theirs deteriorate. Finally, if the
new threshold point is b3, matches improve for low-ability workers and deteriorate for high-ability
workers, and the opposite for managers.
To understand when each outcome may occur and its implications for inequality, we suppose
rst that relative factor intensities are the same in the two industries; i.e., 1 = 2. In such
circumstances, the two sectoral matching functions m1 (qH) and m2 (qH) of an HH=LL equilibrium
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must shift in the same direction in response to any small changes in the relative price p2=p1 (see
the online appendix). Although we have not been able to prove that the same must occur for large
price changes, neither could we nd any numerical counterexamples. It seems that with 1 = 2,
the threshold must shift to a point like b1 or b2, with matches either improving for all workers and
deteriorating for all managers, or vice versa; see Lim (2015) for further discussion.
Figure 4: E¤ects of a 10% increase in p2 on wages and salaries in an HH=LL equilibrium without
Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects
Figure 4 depicts an example of the wage and salary e¤ects that result from an increase in
the relative price of the good produced by the economys least able workers and managers when
factor intensities are the same in both industries (1 = 2) and when workersmatches improve and
managersmatches deteriorate everywhere. The example depicts a case such as in Figure 3, when the
threshold shifts to a point such as b1. The parameter values that underlie this example are provided
in Lim (2015). Notice that the improved matching for workers implies a ubiquitous increase in
within occupation-and-industry wage inequality; in each sector, the more able workers gain relative
to the less able workers. Meanwhile, wages rise in the low-paying industry 2 relative to those in
the high-paying industry 1. An economy-wide measure of wage inequality will reect a balancing
of these o¤setting forces. At the same time, managerial salaries become more equal both within
industries, across industries, and for the economy as a whole. Clearly, factor specicity explains the
cross-industry redistribution, while rematching in the presence of factor complementarities explains
the within-industry e¤ects.
We can also deduce the implications for real incomes in this case. The inverse matching function
becomes steeper at point a in Figure 3 when the threshold shifts from b to b1. By Lemmas 1 and
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6 in the appendix, this implies that the real income of the economys least able worker must rise.
A fortiori, real wages must rise for all workers who were initially employed in sector 2. Notice in
Figure 4 that the proportional wage hikes for all workers initially in sector 2 exceed 10%, which
is the percentage increase in the price of good 2 that is reected in this example. Meanwhile, the
inverse matching function becomes atter at point c, which implies a fall in the real income for
the economys most able worker and, a fortiori, for all workers who remain employed in industry 1
after the price change. Indeed, in Figure 4 , nominal wages (in terms of good 1) fall for all workers
initially in sector 1. In these circumstances, the salaries of the least able managers must fall in
terms of good 2, while the salaries of the most able managers must rise in terms of good 1.17 It
follows that real incomes may increase (or decrease) for some (or all) of the managers, depending
on the composition of their consumption baskets.
To summarize our ndings for an HH=LL equilibrium with equal factor intensities, we have
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds, that 1 = 2, and that that there exists a
threshold equilibrium with an HH=LL sorting pattern in which the more able types sort to some
sector i, i 2 f1; 2g. Then a small increase in the relative price pj=pi: (i) improves matches for all
types of one factor F and deteriorates matches for all types of the other factor K, F;K 2 fH;Lg,
K 6= F ; (ii) raises within occupation-and-industry income inequality for factor F and reduces it for
factor K in both sectors; (iii) reduces between-industry inequality for both factors; and (iv) raises
real earnings of all types of factor F that are initially employed in the expanding sector and reduces
them for all types of factor F that remain employed in the contracting sector.
The e¤ects on within occupation-and-industry inequality, on between-industry inequality, and
on real incomes described in Proposition 6 do not require that factor intensities be the same in
the two industries. They arise anytime the matching functions shift in the same direction in both
sectors. However, such shifts in the sectoral matching functions are more likely to occur when the
factor-intensity di¤erence is small.
We next consider opposing shifts in the two industry matching functions that can occur when
factor-intensity di¤erences are substantial. In Figure 3, we illustrated a case in which the threshold
shifts to point b3, such that the inverse matching function shifts up in industry 2 and down in
industry 1. Alternatively (but not shown in the gure), the inverse matching function for sector 1
might be atter than that for sector 2, and the former might shift up while the latter shifts down.
In the online appendix, we prove that the inverse matching function for some sector i is steeper
than that for sector j at a point of intersection if and only if i > j . Moreover, if matches improve
for workers in one sector and deteriorate for those in the other, the upgrading always occurs in the
labor-intensive industry.
Figure 5 depicts outcomes for another example described in Lim (2015). In this example, the
relative price rises in a labor-intensive sector that also happens to attract the economys least
able workers and managers. The gure shows that an increase in the relative price of good 2
17These statements follow from the fact that the inverse matching function becomes steeper at a but atter at c.
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(the good produced by the low-ability types) generates a spread of the wage distribution in the
former sector and a contraction in the latter. Between-industry wage inequality narrows thanks to
the relative gains for the low-ability workers who have a comparative advantage in the expanding
sector. Meanwhile, salary inequality narrows among managers in the expanding sector, widens
among those who remain in the contracting sector, and diminishes between industries.
Figure 5: E¤ects of a 10% increase in p2 on wages and salaries in an HH=LL equilibrium with
opposite shifts in sectoral matching functions and moderate Stolper-Samuelson forces
In this example, all workers initially employed in sector 2 enjoy real incomes gains; their wages
rise proportionately more than the price increase of 10%. This is always true when the labor-
intensive sector employs the least able workers and the relative price of the labor-intensive good
rises, because Lemmas 1 and 6 in the appendix ensure that the real wage in terms of good 2
increases for the worker with ability qLmin and other workers initially employed in the industry
fare even better. In the example, the wages of workers who remain in sector 1 increase less than
in proportion to the rise in p2, but a stronger Stolper-Samuelson force could generate real income
gains for these workers as well. Meanwhile, managers who remain in sector 1 see a decline in their
real salaries inasmuch as the Stolper-Samuelson force and the Ricardo-Viner force push in the same
direction. The decline in real income for the managers of type qHmax is ensured by Lemma 6, and
the other managers who remain in the industry lose ground relative to this type.
Our next proposition summarizes our ndings for an HH=LL equilibrium in which the sectoral
matching functions shift in opposite directions in the two industries. This outcome requires that
the factor intensities di¤er su¢ ciently across the two sectors.
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Proposition 7 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds and that there exists a threshold equilibrium with
an HH=LL sorting pattern. If a change in relative price improves matches for factor F 2 fH;Lg
in one sector but not the other, then the matches must improve in the sector that uses factor F
intensively. This generates an increase in within occupation-and-industry inequality for types of
factor F employed in the F -intensive sector and a reduction in within occupation-and-industry
inequality for types employed in the other sector. Between industry inequality declines for both
factors if and only if the relative price rises for the good produced by the less able types. If industry
i uses factor F relatively intensively and pi=pj rises, then real incomes increase for all types of
factor F initially employed in industry i and fall for all types of factor K, K 6= F , that remain
employed in industry j, j 6= i.
The outcomes described in Proposition 7 and illustrated in Figure 5 are broadly consistent with
the data for Brazil before and after its major trade reform in 1991. As we report in the online
appendix, changes in relative prices from 1986 to 1994 are positively correlated with changes in
within-industry inequality among workers and negatively correlated with changes in within-industry
inequality among managers.
5.2.2 Inequality in an HL=LH Equilibrium
In Figure 6, the solid curves cd and ab depict the qualitative features of the inverse matching
function in an HL=LH equilibrium in which industry 2 attracts the more able managers and the
less able workers. Each segment is upward sloping, representing the PAM that occurs within each
sector. But, as the gure shows, PAM does not apply to the economy as a whole.
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Figure 6: E¤ects of a rise in p2=p1 on matching: HL=LH equilibrium
Now suppose that the relative price of good 2 rises. As we have noted, the allocations to
industry 2 of both workers and managers must expand on the extensive margin. In other words,
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qL rises to a point like ~q

L, while q

H falls to a point like ~q

H . Accordingly, the new boundary points
for industry 1 move to a0 and b0, whereas those for industry 2 become c0 and d0.
The ex post inverse matching function for industry 1 connects a0 with b0. By Lemma 2 in
the appendix, it cannot cross ab more than once. Evidently, the new curve for industry 1 must
lie everywhere below the initial curve, as drawn. By similar reasoning, the new inverse matching
function for industry 2 also lies everywhere below the old curve; it must connect c0 and d0 and it
cannot cross cd twice. Thus, every worker initially employed in industry 2 or ultimately employed
in industry 1 matches with a less able manager than before. Correspondingly, all managers who
initially were employed in industry 2 or who remain employed in industry 1 are matched with more
able workers than before.
This rematching again has implications for within occupation-and-industry income inequality.
The downward shift in the inverse matching function for industry 2 implies, by (11), that the
relative wage of any worker rises relative to that of another, more able worker in the same industry.
This means that the wage schedule among workers in industry 2 tilts in favor of those at the bottom
end of the industry pay scale. The same is true among workers that remain employed in sector 1
subsequent to the contraction of that industry. Within occupation-and-industry inequality declines
for this group of workers as well. Moreover, wage inequality declines in the set of workers that
switches industries.18
Figure 7 shows the wage and salary e¤ects for another parameterized example from Lim (2015).
The gure displays the qualitative features described in the previous paragraph. In particular, the
plot of proportional wage changes against qL in the top panel is downward sloping along its entire
length. Wage inequality narrows in both sectors and in the economy as a whole. The results for
managerial salaries are analogous, but opposite, as depicted in the bottom panel of gure.
We summarize our ndings about the e¤ects of relative price movements on wage and salary
inequality in an HL=LH equilibrium in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds and that there exists a threshold equilibrium with
an HL=LH sorting pattern in which the low-ability types of factor F and the high-ability types of
factor K sort to industry i for all relative prices in some connected interval, K 2 fH;Lg, K 6= F
and i 2 f1; 2g. Then any increase in the relative price of good i within this interval raises within
occupation-and-industry income inequality and overall income inequality among types of factor K
and reduces within occupation-and-industry income inequality and overall income inequality among
types of factor F .
Notice that Proposition 8 makes no reference to the factor intensities in the two sectors.
While Proposition 8 speaks to inequality within occupations, it says nothing about redistribution
between occupations, nor about the e¤ects of trade on the (absolute) real income levels of any
18Consider two workers, with abilities qLc and qLd that both switch industries, with qLc > qLd. By (7), the
elasticity of the wage schedule "w(qL) is determined, ex post, by the elasticity ratio for the expanding industry i;
whereas beforehand it was determined by the elasticity ratio for the contracting industry j. The condition for the
sorting of high-abiilty workers to sector i implies that the former elasticity ratio is higher. Accordingly, the wage
elasticity falls among this group of workers.
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Figure 7: E¤ects of a 10% increase in p2 on wages and salaries in an HL=LH equilibrium without
Stolper-Samuelson forces
groups. For this we turn to numerical simulations whose details are reported in Lim (2015). When
di¤erences in factor intensities are small, Stolper-Samuelson forces are negligible. Then our ndings
are consistent with the intuition of the Ricardo-Viner model. When the relative price of the good
produced by the low-ability workers and the high-ability manager rises, the highest-ability manager
and the lowest-ability worker both see their real incomes rise. These individuals are the ones with
the strongest comparative advantage in the expanding sector. In general, incomes of those (workers
or managers) who are initially employed in the expanding sector rise substantially relative to those
of their occupational counterparts that remain employed in the contracting sector. In the example
depicted in Figure 7, all workers who remain in industry 1 su¤er real wage losses. The managers
in industry 1, on the other hand, see small nominal salary gains, and so their real incomes might
rise if their expenditures are su¢ ciently biased toward the good they produce. In any case, this
example highlights the between-industry redistribution that results from specicity of the di¤erent
factor types.
In an economy with a substantial di¤erence in factor intensities, on the other hand, the Stolper-
Samuelson e¤ect becomes relevant. If, for example, industry 2 is signicantly more worker-intensive
than industry 1 workers of all types may see a rise in real wage, while all managers may su¤er real
income losses. Of course, the workers employed in industry 2 fare better than their counterparts
in industry 1, since their types confer a comparative advantage in producing good 2. Similarly,
the very able managers employed in industry 2 experience smaller real income losses than their
less able counterparts. Proposition 8 prescribes a ubiquitous increase in salary inequality and a
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ubiquitous fall in wage inequality. A host of other congurations can emerge, but all can be under-
stood similarly with reference to the relevant factor intensities that generate between-occupation
redistribution and the sector-specicities that generate between-industry redistribution; see Lim
(2015) for further examples.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a framework that can be used to study the e¤ects of trade on income inequality.
Our model features two industries, two factors of production, and perfect competition, in keeping
with a familiar setting from neoclassical trade theory. Indeed, we have chosen this economic envi-
ronment so that we might draw on a deep understanding of the distributional e¤ects of trade in the
Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models. To the standard set-up, we have added heterogeneous
types of each of the two factors of production. With this simple extension, our model is capable of
generating rich predictions about the e¤ects of trade on within occupation-and-industry earnings
inequality. Such e¤ects seem to be important in the data, yet are beyond the reach of much of the
existing literature.
Redistribution within occupations and industries occurs in response to relative price changes
whenever technologies exhibit strong complementarities between the types of the various factors
that are employed together in a production unit. We have assumed that productivity in each unit
is a log supermodular function of the ability of the manager and the ability levels of the workers
and we have allowed for cross-sectoral di¤erences in factor intensity as well as di¤erences in the
complementarities between worker and manager types.
The e¤ects of trade on income distribution are mediated by relative output prices. Accordingly,
we have studied how changes in prices a¤ect the equilibrium wage and salary schedules. We have
focused on threshold equilibria in which all of the more able workers sort to one industry while all
of the less able workers sort to the other, and similarly for managers.
Our analysis can provide guidance to the empirical researcher. It points to the importance of
distinguishing employees by occupation and industry when studying the e¤ects of trade on income
inequality. As we know from the classic papers in neoclassical trade theory, the distributional e¤ects
of changes in the trade environment can di¤er for managers versus workers and for employees in an
export industry versus those in an import-competing industry. To this we have added the e¤ects of
trade on within occupation-and-industry inequality, and we have derived novel predictions about
this type of inequality that have clear empirical implications.
A broad implication of this theory is that, whenever a change in the terms of trade induces
improved matches in an industry for some factor, the within occupation-and-industry earnings
inequality in the group increases. A downgrading of matches for some factor in some industry in
turn generates a decline in within-group inequality. These predictions reect the assumption that
the more able (and better paid) types benet relatively more from the upgrading of their partners
than do their less able counterparts. This is a keystone for more specic results that link changes
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in inequality to structural features of the economic environment. When changes in matching are
observable, this prediction of the model can be tested directly. Otherwise the empirical analysis
can build on other relationships predicted by the theory.
One specic prediction of our model is that, when the more able managers and the more able
workers sort to the same industry, as appears to be true in the Brazilian data reported in the
online appendix, and when the di¤erence in factor intensities across industries is not too large, a
change in the terms of trade increases the within occupation-and-industry earnings inequality for
one factor of production and reduces it for the other. In this case of economy-wide PAM and small
factor-intensity di¤erences, matches necessarily improve for one factor and deteriorate for the other
in both sectors of the economy.
But we have also found that, in an equilibrium in which the more able types of both factors sort
to the same industry, a shift in the terms of trade may induce match upgrades for some factor in
one sector and downgrades in the other sector. This outcome requires a su¢ ciently large di¤erence
across industry in factor intensities. When it occurs, the within occupation-and-industry earnings
inequality of each factor widens in one industry and narrows in the other. The theory also predicts
in which industry a factors within-group earnings inequality should increase: that should happen
in the industry that uses the factor intensively.
When the more able managers sort to the same sector as the less able workers, the within
occupation-and-industry earnings inequality of each factor moves in the same direction in every
industry in response to a change in the terms of trade. Inequality widens for the factor whose most
able types are employed in the industry that has experienced a relative price hike and declines for
the factor whose most able types are employed in the other industry. If instances of negative PAM
across sectors can be found in some economies, these predictions about the relationship between
price movements and inequality changes should be readily testable.
Our approach to introducing factor heterogeneity could also be applied to other trade models.
For example, it would be straightforward to incorporate matching of heterogeneous types of multiple
factors in a setting à la Sampson (2014) with monopolistic competition and xed costs of exporting.
Or one could do so in a model of horizontal foreign direct investment, to study the formation of
international production teams, as in Antràs et al. (2006). We think it would be particularly
interesting to introduce search frictions to capture possible impediments to the perfect matching
of worker and manager types. In such a setting, one could ask how globalization impacts the
formation of production teams and thereby the productivity of rms.
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Appendix
Lemmas and Proofs for Section 4
Assume that Assumption 1holds and suppose that some sector employs workers and managers
whose abilities form the intervals IL = [qLa; qLb] and IH = [qHa; qHb], respectively. To simplify
notation, we drop the sectoral index i and we consider the following industry equilibrium conditions
corresponding to (8) - (10) for one particular sector:
r (qH) = p
1
1  [qH ;m (qH)]
1
1  w [m (qH)]
  
1  ;  = 

1  (1  ) (12)
 L [qH ;m (qH)]
 [qH ;m (qH)]
=
w0 [m (qH)]
w [m (qH)]
; (13)
H
r (qH)
(1  )w [m (qH)]H (qH) =
LL [m (qH)]m
0 (qH) ; (14)
and the boundary conditions,
m (qHz) = qLz, z = a; b; (15)
qLb > qLa > 0; qHb > qHa > 0:
Equation (12) is taken from (8), (13) is taken from (7) and (14) is taken from (10). We seek to
characterize the solution for the three functions, w (), r () and m ().
We use (12) and (13) to obtain
ln r (qH)  ln r (qH0) =
Z qH
qH0
 H [x;m (x)]
(1  ) [x;m (x)]dx; for qH ; qH0 2 IH ; (16)
lnw (qL)  lnw (qL0) =
Z qL
qL0
 L [ (x) ; x]
 [ (x) ; x]
dx; for qL; qL0 2 IL; (17)
where  () is the inverse of m (). We substitute (12) into (14) to obtain
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1  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
+
1
1   ln p (18)
+
1
1   ln [qH ;m (qH)] + log H (qH)  log L [m (qH)]  logm
0 (qH) :
The di¤erential equations (13) and (18) together with the boundary conditions (15) uniquely de-
termine the solution of w () and m () when the productivity function  () is twice continuously
di¤erentiable and strictly log supermodular and the density functions F (), F = H;L, are contin-
uously di¤erentiable.
By di¤erentiating (18) and substituting (13) into the result, we generate a second-order di¤er-
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ential equation for the matching function,
m00 (qH)
m0 (qH)
=
 H [qH ;m (qH)]
(1  ) [qH ;m (qH)] 
 L [qH ;m (qH)]m
0 (qH)
 [qH ;m (qH)]
+
0H (qH)
H (qH)
  
0
L [m (qH)]m
0 (qH)
L [m (qH)]
: (19)
Given boundary conditions m (qHa) = qLa, m0 (qHa) = ta > 0; this di¤erential equation has a
unique solution, which may or may not satisfy the boundary condition m (qHb) = qLb in (15). The
solution to the original matching problem is found by identifying a value ta that yields a solution
to (19) that satises (15). Note that this solution depends neither on the price p nor on the factor
endowments H and L. Therefore, changes in these variables do no a¤ect the matching function,
but they change all wages and salaries proportionately, as can be seen from (18), and (12). Using
hats to denote proportional changes, e.g., p^ = dp=p, we have
Lemma 1 (i) The matching function m () does not depend on  p; H; L. (ii) An increase in the
price p, p^ > 0, raises the wage and salary schedules proportionately by p^. (iii) An increase in H=L
such that H^   L^ = ^ > 0 raises the wage schedule proportionately by (1  ) ^ and reduces the
salary schedule proportionately by ^.
We now prove several lemmas that are used in the main analysis.
Lemma 2 Let [m{ (qH) ; w{ (qL)] and [m% (qH) ; w% (qL)] be solutions to the di¤erential equations
(13) and (18), each for di¤erent boundary conditions (15), such that m{ (q0) = m% (q0) = qL0
and m0% (q0) > m0{ (q0) for q0 2 SH{ \ SH%. Then m% (qH) > m{ (qH) for all qH > q0 and
m% (qH) < m{ (qH) for all qH < qH0 in the overlapping range of abilities.
Proof. Consider qH > qH0 and suppose that, contrary to the claim, there exists a qH1 > qH0
such that m% (qH1)  m{ (qH1). Then di¤erentiability of m (),  = {; %, implies that there
exists qH2 > qH0 such that m% (qH2) = m{ (qH2), m% (qH) > m{ (qH) for all qH 2 (qH0; qH2) and
m0% (qH2) < m0{ (qH2). This also implies % (x) < { (x) for all x 2 (m% (qH0) ;m% (qH2)), where
 () is the inverse of m (). Under these conditions (18) implies w% [m% (qH0)] < w{ [m% (qH0)]
and w% [m% (qH2)] > w{ [m% (qH2)], and therefore
w{ [m% (qH2)]  w{ [m% (qH0)] < w% [m% (qH2)]  w% [m% (qH0)] :
On the other hand, (17) implies
lnw [m% (qH2)]  lnw [m% (qH0)] =
Z m%(qH2)
m%(qH0)
 L [ (x) ; x]
 [ (x) ; x]
dx;  = {; %:
Together with the previous inequality, this givesZ m%(qH2)
m%(qH0)
 L [{ (x) ; x]
 [{ (x) ; x]
dx <
Z m%(qH2)
m%(qH0)
 L

% (x) ; x

 

% (x) ; x
 dx:
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Note, however, that strict log supermodularity of  () and % (x) < { (x) for all
x 2 (m% (qH0) ;m% (qH2)) imply the reverse inequality, a contradiction. It follows that m% (qH) >
m{ (qH) for all qH > qH0. A similar argument shows that m% (qH) < m{ (qH) for all qH < qH0.
We next show how the matching function and wage function respond to the boundary conditions.
First consider the shift of the equilibrium matching function in response to a rise in qLb, which shifts
the boundary point (qHb; qLb) but not (qHa; qLa) in (15). It then follows from Lemma 2 that the
old and new matching functions intersect only at qHa. Therefore an increase in qLb increases the
ability of workers matched with every manager except for the least able manager. Other shifts in
the boundary points can be analyzed in similar fashion to establish
Lemma 3 (i) dm (qH) =dqLa > 0 for all qH < qHb and d (qL) =dqLa < 0 for all qL < qLb; (ii)
dm (qH) =dqLb > 0 for all qH > qHa and d (qL) =dqLb < 0 for all qL > qLa; (iii) d (qL) =dqHa > 0
for all qL < qLb and dm (qH) =dqHa < 0 for all qH < qHb; and (iv) d (qL) =dqHb > 0 for all
qL > qLa and dm (qH) =dqHb < 0 for all qH > qHa.
Next consider changes in a boundary (qHz; qLz), z = a; b. For concreteness, suppose that
(qHb; qLb) changes. Then the new and old matching functions coincide at the other boundary point,
(qHa; qLa), which does not change. In this case, Lemma 2 implies that either the two matching
functions coincide in the overlapping range of abilities or one is above the other everywhere except
for at (qHa; qLa). A similar argument applies to changes in (qHa; qLa). We thus have:
Lemma 4 In response to a shift in a single boundary (qHz; qLz), z = a; b, either the new match-
ing functions coincide with the old matching function in the overlapping range of abilities or one
matching function is above the other everywhere except for at the opposite boundary point.
We next discuss the impact of boundaries on wages and salaries. We focus on wages, but note
that if a shift in boundaries raises the wage of workers with ability qL then it must reduce the
salary of managers teamed with these workers. This can be seen from (12) by noting that a change
in boundaries has no impact on r () through an induced shift in the matching function due to
the rst-order condition (13) (a version of the Envelope Theorem). Therefore the change in salary
r (qH) is driven by the change in wages of workers matched with managers of ability qH . We record
this result in
Lemma 5 Suppose that the boundaries (qHz; qLz), z = a; b, change and that, as a result, w (qL)
rises for some qL such that qL and qH = m 1 (qL) are in the overlapping range of abilities of the
old and new boundaries. Then r (qH) declines.
For the subsequent analysis the following lemma is useful:
Lemma 6 Let [m{ (qH) ; w{ (qL)] and [m% (qH) ; w% (qL)] be solutions to (13) and (18), each for
di¤erent boundary conditions (15), such that m{ (qH0) = m% (qH0) = qL0 and m0% (qH0) > m0{ (qH0)
for some qH0 2 SL{ \SL%, and let r% (qH) and r{ (qH) be the corresponding solutions to (12). Then
w% (qL) < w{ (qL) and r% (qH) > r{ (qH) in the overlapping range of abilities.
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Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that m% (qH) > m{ (qH) for all qH > qH0 and m% (qH) < m{ (qH)
for all qH < qH0 in the overlapping range of abilities and % (x) < { (x) for all x > qL0 and
% (x) > { (x) for all x < qL0 in the overlapping range of abilities. Moreover, m
0
% (qH0) > m
0
{ (qH0)
and (18) imply
lnw{ (qL0) > lnw% (qL0)
while (17) implies
lnw (qL)  lnw (qL0) =
Z qL
qL0
 L [ (x) ; x]
 [ (x) ; x]
dx;  = {; %:
Together, these inequalities imply
lnw{ (qL)  lnw% (qL) >
Z qL
qL0
 L [{ (x) ; x]
 [{ (x) ; x]
dx 
Z qL
qL0
 L

% (x) ; x

 

% (x) ; x
dx
=
Z qL0
qL
 L

% (x) ; x

 

% (x) ; x
dx  Z qL0
qL
 L [{ (x) ; x]
 [{ (x) ; x]
dx:
For qL > qL0, the right-hand side of the rst line is positive by the strict log supermodularity of
the productivity function and % (x) < { (x) for all x > qL0, and the second line is positive for
qL < qL0 by the strict log supermodularity of the productivity function and % (x) > { (x) for all
x < qL0. It follows that w{ (qL) > w% (qL) for all qL in the overlapping range of abilities. A similar
argument establishes that r{ (qH) < r% (qH) for all qH in the overlapping range of abilities.
This lemma, together with Lemma 4, have straightforward implications for the impact of bound-
ary points on the wage and salary functions.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the lower boundary (qHa; qLa) changes and the matching function shifts
upwards as a result. Then salaries decline and wages rise in the overlapping range of abilities. The
converse holds when the matching function shifts downwards.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the upper boundary (qHb; qLb) changes and the matching function shifts
upwards as a result. Then salaries rise and wages decline in the overlapping range of abilities. The
converse holds when the matching function shifts downwards.
From (17) we also see that a change in boundaries that shifts upwards the matching function
reduces wage inequality, because for every two ability levels the ratio of the wage of a high-ability
worker to the wage of a low-ability worker declines for all types in between. For salaries it is the
opposite, as one can see from (16). We therefore have
Lemma 7 Suppose that the matching function shifts upwards in response to a shift in the bound-
aries (15). Then wage inequality narrows and salary inequality widens. The opposite is true when
the matching function shifts downwards.
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